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of process of the Honorable Dean E. Conder, a 
judge of the Third Judicial District in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. 
Walter L. Plumb, III 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
John L. McCoy 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SUMMA CORPORATION, 
A California Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
LANCER INDUSTRIES, INC., 
An Illinois Corporation, 




NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 15149 
Appellant-defendant, Lancer Industries was granted 
its motion to dismiss pursuant to a special appearance and 
motion to dismiss based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
from the District Court of the Third Judicial District. The 
Utah Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and held that the 
parties should be permitted to go forward. A special appearance 
and motion to dismiss was then filed by the appellant-defendant 
based upon lack of jurisdiction over the person of Lancer 
Industries. A ruling is asked for on the validity of in personam 
jurisdiction over Lancer Industries, Inc. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This appeal arises out of the refusal of the D~~k 
Court to grant appellant's motion to quash service of prochs 
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant respectfully asks this Court to reverse u.. 
trial court's order denying the motion of appellant to dismis: 
for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. 
Appellant respectfully asks this Court to reverse t:. 
ruling of the trial court that the courts of Utah have juris-
diction over the defendant Lancer for the purpose of deciding 
the controversy between the parties. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Suit was brought by Summa Corporation, a California 
corporation, with its principal place of business in Van Nuys, 
California (R.l) against the defendant Lancer Industries a~ 
Synergetics, a limited partnership. 
Appellant Lancer Industries, Inc., is the partner ir 
the limited partnership of Synergetics (R. 8). Synergetics i: 
a partner in a general partnership owning a parcel of real 
1 d ' Fl . d (R 8) Thi' s lawsuit aris: property ocate in Tampa, ori a . . 
out of a dispute concerning the performance of a contract 
between the respondent, Summa Corporation, and the general par 
a feas ibilitY nership, whereby the respondent was to prepare 
-2-
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study concerning the optimum use for development of the afore-
said parcel of property. The affidavits of appellants show that 
a full scale trial would be required in this matter because said 
study contained serious errors and was inadequate in view of 
physical characteristics of the parcel of property and the 
economic situation of the Tampa, Florida vicinity. Appellant 
and its partners, therefore, refused to pay the fee of the 
respondent, who filed this lawsuit in the Third Judicial District 
Court in the State of Utah (R. 8). 
Neither Synergetics nor Lancer Industries, Inc., has 
any property, real, personal or otherwise in the state of Utah, 
and neither of the said defendants do business in any respect in 
the state of Utah (R. 49-50). The only contact Synergetics has 
with the state of Utah is to merely have its Articles of Limited 
Partnership filed here (R. 49-50). However, appellant has not 
engaged in any business within the state of Utah. The only 
affiliation Lancer Industries has with the state of Utah is the 
fact that its president resides here, while its place of incor-
poration and principal place of business is Illinois {R. 7). 
Also, Lancer Industries does business in five other states, in-
cluding Florida, having a process agent in each (R. 49-50). 
All business from which this action arises took place 
in the state of Florida and not Utah, since Florida is where the 
-3-
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property is located, the contract was entered into perf 
' orrnanc; 
was to take place, and wher th 11 d b e e a ege reach occurred. (R.: 
8, 13, and 15). 
Appellant contends by special appearance (R. S) that 
the Utah forum should not assert in personam jurisdiction over 
it because of the lack of any minimum contacts of the appel!a, 
within the state of Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION OVER A FOREIGN 
CORPORATION HAS NOT EVOLVED TO SUCH AN EXTENT 
SO AS TO SUBJECT LANCER INDUSTRIES OR 
SYNERGETICS TO VALID SERVICE OF PROCESS BY 
ANOTHER FOREIGN CORPORATION. 
The evolution of in personam jurisdiction over a for; 
business entity, began with a holding, that a foreign corporat: 
could not be used in an action for the recovery of a personal 
demand outside the state by which it was chartered. Pennoyer 
Neff, 95 u. S. 714 (1877). Mr. Chief Justice Taney, soheldo: 
the belief that a corporation must dwell in the place of its 
creation and cannot migrate to another sovereignty. This vfr• 
was coupled with the doctrine that an officer of the corporati. 
does not carry his function with him when he leaves the state, 
1 · 106 S 350 (1882) This view of the exer: St. C air v. Cox, U. • • 
of a corporation from suit in a state other than its creation" 
the cause of much inconvenience and often manifest injustice. 
-4-
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great increase in the number of corporations and th · 
, e immense 
extent of their business, only made the injustice more frequent 
and marked. "To meet and obviate this inconvenience and in-
justice legislatures, interposed and provided for service of 
process on officers and agents of foreign corporations doing 
business therein. This change was rationalized on the basis 
that the corporation doing business in those states were 
protected by their laws; allowed to carry on business within 
their borders, and sue in their courts, it seemed only right 
that it should be held responsible in those courts to obliga-
tions and liabilities that it incurred ~hereu. 73 Harvard Law 
Review 909, 916, (1917). 
Even though the holding in Pennoyer was liberalized, 
the rule that the mere presence of an officer of a foreign 
corporation in another state will not subject the corporation 
to suit has not changed. The Supreme Court of Utah has so held 
in Western Gas Appliances v. Servel, Inc., 257 P2d 950, (1953). 
See also St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882), 73 Harvard Law 
Review, 909, 919, (1958); and Dykes v. Reliable Furniture & 
Carpet, 277 P2d 969, 971, 3 Utah 2d, 34, 37, (1954). Thus, the 
fact that an officer of Lancer Industries was served while merely 
residing in the state of Utah does not make Lancer Industries 
amenable to service of process~ since residency simply means 
to be present. Bohn v. Better Biscuits, Cal. App., 78 P2d 1177, 
-5-
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(1938); In re Cahall, 143 NYS 2d 511, 514, 208, Misc. 28?; La: 
-..; 
v. u. s., Wis 1 Pin. 77, 79; 33 A W&P 1. 
The metamorphosis of in personam jurisdiction over 
0 
foreign corporation was extended by International Shoe co 
• V, 
Washington, 326 U. S. 310 ( 1945), and limited by Hanson v. Dar 
357 u. s. 235 (1958). 
In International Shoe, the Supreme Court reject~~ 
consent and presence theories and accepted a new rationale. 
The International Shoe Company, sued in the 
state court for unpaid unemployment-compensation 
contributions, challenged the court's iurisdicti~ 
over its person, arguing that its activities willi~ 
the state were not sufficient to manifest its prese:. 
there. The Supreme Court of Washington was of the 
opinion that the corporation's regular solicitatioo 
within the state should be sufficient to constitute 
"doing business,'.' but rested its decision upon the 
familiar solicitation-plus rule after finding enouo· 
additional activities to uphold jurisdiction on tt~ 
basis. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 154P: 
801, 812, 22 Wash. 2d 146, 169-70, (1945). On appe: 
to the Supreme Court, Mr. Chief Justice Stone dis· 
carded the presence and consent theories as mere 
legal conclusions that the assumption of jurisdicfr 
was reasonable. In place of these he offered a 
new standard: whether the corporation had certain 
"minimum contacts" with the state such that the mfil; 
tenance of the suit would not offend traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice. . 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 3lu 
(1945). 
Since under the old analysis, presence wd 
, t'' 
predicated upon contacts with the state, the Co~ ' 
formulation might have been regarded as merely a DI• 
verbalization of the old theory. However, the old. 
· · · fficient t. test looked to a quantum of act1v1t1es su 
establish a basis of jurisdiction for all suits, 
whereas Mr. Chief Justice Stone's approach made f' 
jurisdiction depend on all of the circumstances 0 
-6-
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particular case. Although he emphasized the import-
ance of the activities of the corporation, he 
indicated that these were not to be considered 
quantitatively but were to be examined in terms of 
their "quality and nature" and their connection with 
the obligations sued upon. Id. at 319-320. 
In deciding that case the Court noted that the activities 
of the International Shoe Company in Washington was continuous 
and resulted in a large volume of business activity in the state 
and that the obligation sued upon arose out of these activities. 
"L'!'./hese operations," it concluded, "establish sufficient contacts 
or ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just 
according to our traditional conception of fair play and substan-
tial justice to permit the state to enforce the obligations which 
appellant has incurred there." Id. at 320. 
Taking the Shoe doctrine and comparing it to the instant 
case it is obvious that Lancer Industries did not establish mini-
mum contact to a degree sufficient to warrant the imposition of 
in personam jurisdiction over it, since there was neither solicit-
ation nor continuous volume of business activity. Furthermore, 
this controversy does not arise out of any association in which 
the two companies have engaged within the state of Utah. More-
over, neither of these criteria existed with regards to Synergetics; 
hence, under the test of International Shoe to allow jurisdiction 
over either party would, in essence, offend notions of fair play 
and substantial justice. 
-7-
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The case of Hansen v. Danckla, 357, U.S. 235 (19 581 
provides the appellant with a further outpost of security in 
tbis area. In that case, a Delaware corporate trustee was fo. 
not to be amenable to Florida's in personam jurisdiction beca, 
there were no activities, purposefully carried on by the trust 
in Florida. The Court held that there must exist some activit 
by which the defendant purposefully availed itself, "of the 
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thu: 
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Id. at 2:. 
It might be said that Synergetics, of which Lancer 
Industries is a general partner, might have purposefully avail: 
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the st 
of Utah and thus able to be protected by its laws because of i· 
filing of Articles of Limited Partnership, had it actually 
engaged in any business. However, when one considers the fill! 
requirement of minimum contacts, it becomes evident that there 
does not exist a basis of jurisdiction over Lancer Industries; 
Synergetics. 
Utah law is consistent and unqualified with the doctr 
set forth in International Shoe and Hansen. 
"Jurisdiction over nonresidents---Acts submitting 
person to jurisdiction.-- Any person, notwithsta~ 
section 16 10 102, whether or not a citizen or 
resident of this state, who in person or through 
an agent does any of the following enumerated a~ 
. . d . . d 1 h . s personal 
submits himself, and if an in ivi ua , i ~ 
-8-
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representative, to the jurisdiction of the 
courts of this state as to any claim arising from: 
(1) The transaction of any business within 
this state; 
(2) Contracting to supply services or goods 
in this state; 
(3) The causing of any injury within this 
state whether tortious or by breach of warrant; 
(4) The ownership, use, or possession of any 
real estate situated in this state; 
(5) Contracting to insure any person, property 
or risk located within this state at the time of 
contracting. 
(6) With respect to actions of divorce and 
separate maintenance, the maintenance in this state 
of a matrimonial domicile at the time the claim 
arose or the commission in this state of the act 
qiving rise to the claim." UCA 1953 Section 78-27-24. 
The code further provides: (1) That the words "any 
person" is to encompass any individual, fi~m, company, association, 
or corporation. (2) That the words "transaction of business 
within this state" means activities of a non-resident person, 
his agent, or representatives in the state which affect persons 
or businesses within the state of Utah. UCA 1953, Section 78-27-23. 
In the case at hand, no persons or business in the state 
of Utah have been affected by either Lancer Industries or 
Synergetics, nor is there any allegation to bring the service of 
process or parties within any of the provisions of Section 78-27-
24 or 25 UCA. 
In Hill v. Zale corporation, 482 P2d 332, 25 Utah 2d 
357 (1971) the phrase "transaction of business within this state," 
was delineated. 
-9-
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"If there is any difference between what is 
stated as the "doing business" and the "minimal 
contacts" tests it is probably more in semantics 
than in substance. In practical application 
they are essentially the same. When the problem 
arises, its solution depends on whether it can 
fairly be said that the corporation is doing 
business within the State in a real and substant~ 
ial sense. This involves the analysis of a 
number of factors, none of which is alone the 
sine qua non to establish a business presence in 
the State, but from a consideration of the total 
picture as to the existence or absence of them 
the answer to that critical question is to be 
found: 
1. Whether there are local offices, stores 
or outlets; 
2. The presence of personnel, how hired, 
fired and paid; the degree of control and the 
nature of their duties; 
3. The manner of holding out to the public 
by way of advertising, telephone listings, 
catalogs, etc.; 
4. The presence of its property, real or 
personal, or interest therein, including in-
ventories, bank accounts, etc.; 
5. Whether the activities are sporadic 
or transitory as compared to continuous and 
systematic; 
6. The extent to which the alleged facts 
of the asserted claim arose from activities 
within the state; 
7. The relative hardship or convenience 
to the oarties in being reguired to litigate 
the controversy in the state or elsewhere." 
Id. at 334, (emphasis added); Casper v. Smith & W~ 
346 P2d 409, 53 Cal. 2d 77 (1957); Fisher Governor Co. v. Su_Et 
Court, 347 P2d 1, 53 Cal. 2d 222, 1 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1957) · Quit; 
·obviously, none of the above factors exist in this case. 
contacts th·e defendants have with the forum state are that 
The: 
. . . t' 
· 1 of Limited Partnership in Synergetics has filed its Artie es 
I ndustries merely state of Utah, and the president of Lancer 
-10-
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resides in the state of Utah. 
While it is provided that a limited partnership file 
for record a certificate indicating the amount of contribution 
by the partners in the office of the County Clerk of the County 
in which the principal place of business of the partnership 
shall be situated, UCA 1953 Section 48-2-2 (1) (b), there is no 
clear indication from, UCA § 48-2-2 ·(l) (b), that its purpose 
is to establish a basis of jurisdiction over partnerships 
complying with it. Morelikely, the filing of Articles of 
Limited Partnership is for the purpose of merely establishing 
its existence, and ability to transact business. 
In addition, to allow the mere residency of a corpor-
ate officer to establish a basis for in personam jurisdiction 
over the corporation would abrogate the well ingrained minimum 
contacts test, and severly restrict a corporate officers choice 
of residency. 
POINT II. 
ASSERTION OF IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION BY THE 
STATE OF UTAH WOULD BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
UNDER THE 14TH AMENDMENT BECAUSE OF THE 
RESULTING HARDSHIP AND INCONVENIENCE UPON THE 
APPELLANT. 
The last factor mentioned in Hill is the relative hard-
ship or convenience to the parties in being required to litigate 
-11-
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....., 
the controversy in Utah as opposed to Florida. 
"Inconvenience to the defendant is the 
primary consideration which may make an assertion 
of jurisdiction over a corporation unconstitution 1 
. a 
since neither the plaintiff, who has indicated -
his choice of forum, nor the state, whose courts 
may dismiss the action on the basis of forum non 
conveniens, needs constitutional protection. 
Therefore, the process of determining the con-
stitutionality of the forum's assertion of juris-
diction over the defendant involves the balancil"\Sl 
of certain interests against the inconvenience to 
the defendant. The purpose of this balancing 
process is to determine whether entertaining the 
action would be unfair to the defendant. For 
convenient reference the other relevant interests 
may be described as those of the plaintiff and 
of the forum state. Like the defendant, the 
plaintiff has a legitimate interest, for example, 
in not being put to undue expense in litigating 
a claim, though this interest without more has 
not been considered sufficient to require the 
defendant to appear. Further, a state has an 
interest in providing a forum for the effectuation 
of its protective or regulatory policies, but this 
interest in itself is again usually said to be in-
sufficient." 73 Harvard Law Review 909, 929 (1917). 
The reasonable cost estimated of obtaining attendance 
willing witnesses to testify on respondent's behalf at a trial 
Utah would be $11, 257. 24 (R. 20-21). The amount sued for by 
respondent is $16,347.24. Obtaining testimony of each or anyo· 
the nine witnesses by deposition proceedings would be unsatisfa: 
in two respects. First, the cost of taking each deposition wou: 
peci• be prohibitive in terms of attorney's fees and expenses, es · 
if Utah counsel were forced to attend proceedings in Florida. i 
1 . n Florie 
respondent required to retain additional legal counse 1 
tly dirnint' for this limited purpose, the costs would not be grea 
-12- ssf 
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second, this course of action would deprive the Utah trial court 
of the necessary and valuable opportunity to observe the attitude 
and demeanor of each witness and to cross examine on issues where 
further inquiry would expedite court proceedings. 
A possibility of a view of the parcel of property is 
precluded if the trial takes place in Utah. A visual inspection 
of the premises would be appropriate in this case since the rea-
sonableness and adequacy of respondent's performance on the contract 
can only be determined by a careful appraisal of the subject 
property and the adjacent properties and some idea of the economic 
possibilities for the development of such property in Tampa, 
Florida. 
The partners of Synergetics are not amenable to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of this state and no right of contri-
bution could be enforced against them in the state of Utah. While 
Synergetics could, under principles of equity, enforce a right of 
contribution in Florida against the co-obligors on the contract, 
such an action would result in an additional burden because of 
the necessity and expense of an additional trial. If the original 
lawsuit were instituted in Florida, the necessity for a second 
trial on the issue of contribution as well as the issue of liability 
of the partners would in all likelihood disappear, si.nce they would 
be joined as third party defendants. 
-13-
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The inconvenience to the appellant in being forced tc 
defend this action in Utah is compounded by the inconvenien~ 
to the local court system. To require a Utah court to entertai· 
an action involving Florida law, Florida property and an econo:_ 
feasibility study having no connection with the state of Utah 
with the resultant expense to local taxpayers, the extra burden 
on residents of increased jury duty, the delay caused local 
litigants by an increased case load, and the added burden on an 
already congested court calendar, is at the very least, economi: 
ally unwise in terms of judicial resources and expenditure of 
taxpayers' money. 
It is apparent that considering all of the factors of 
"doing business" or "minimum contacts" cited in the Hill case 
Supra, that there is no jurisdiction over the defendants Lancer 
Industries or Synergetics within the state of Utah. 
POINT III. 
THE PLAINTIFF HAS NEVER SERVED ANY PERSON AS 
REQUIRED BY RULE 4 (e) (4) URCP. 
( ) · d f 11 Personal servk Rule 4 e URCP provi es as o ows: 
within the State shall be as follows: 
· th rwise 
"4 (e) (4) Upon any corporation, not herein o e 
provided for, ... by delivering a copy thereof to 
an officer, managing agent or general agent, or 
to any other agent authorized by appointment or 
. . f oc s ; f no such by law to receive service o pr es ... ~ . 
officer or agent can be found in the county in 
which the action is brought, then upon any such 
-14-
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officer or agent, or any clerk, cashier, managing 
agent, chief clerk, or other agent having the 
management, direction or control of any property 
of such corp~ra~ion, .pa~tnership or other unincorp-
orated association within the State if no other 
officer or agent can be found in the State, and the 
defendant has, or advertises or holds itself out as 
or having, an office or place of business in this 
State, or does business in this State, then on the 
person doing such business or in charge of such 
office or place of business." (emphasis added) 
It is quite apparent from the wording in Rule 4 quoted 
above that the statute contemplates that a partnership, organization, 
or corporation would have a person designated by law to receive 
service of process for it in this state. There is no such person 
in the state of Utah for Lancer Industries or Synergetics (R. 7). 
It is also apparent that the rule contemplates that if no such 
agent is appointed by law which is the case here, then any managing 
agent or chief clerk, etc. who has the management, direction or 
control of any property of such corporation or incorporated 
association with the state is amenable to process, and if no such 
property is in existence within the state, then the rule provides 
that any person in fact doing business or in charge of any office 
or place of business that the corporation has in the state of Utah 
would be amenable to process. 
There is no question but what neither the defendant · 
Lancer Industries nor Synergetics have any property or place of 
business in the state of Utah, and the only connection with the 
state of Utah is a filing of Articles of Limited Partnership for 
-15-
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the purpose of doing business in other states and the mere r~ 
sidence of a corporate officer. 
There is no showing in the record of any other 
purported service of process upon the defendants other than by 
Rule 4(e) (4). The requirements of this rule have not been 
fulfilled, therefore the motion to quash purported service of 
process upon W. A. Bailey should have been quashed. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, from the record herein the defendants 
have never and do not now do business in the state of Utah, the~ 
have no place of business, own no property and have no process 
agent within this state, hence the defendants do not have 
minimal contacts with the state of Utah. The action sued upon 
does not arise from any activities in the state of Utah. The 
defendants have never submitted themselves to the jurisdiction 
of the state of Utah, nor has any designated agent to receive 
process or agent doing business or having charge of property 
within the state of Utah been served, therefore the motion to 
quash service of process and to dismiss for lack of jurisdictio; 
should have been granted. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
RYBERG & McCOY 
John L. McCoy 
Attorney for Appellant 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I DELIVERED TWELVE OF THE 
FOREGOING BRIEFS TO THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF UTAH, 
THIS 15th DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 1977. 
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